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Based on innumerable informal accounts and a number of
scientific studies, there can be no doubt that people often
have quite vivid images of musical sound in their minds,
and that this is the case regardless of levels of musical
training. Various introspective accounts and more recent
neurocognitive research seem to converge in suggesting
that imagery for music is closely linked with imagery for
music-related actions. In this paper, the consequences of
sound–action links for our notions of the sonic image
are discussed, with a particular focus on the relationship
between sonic objects and action chunks. In conclusion,
the exploitation of action imagery is seen as holding great
promise in enhancing our means for musical imagery in
various creative, research and educational contexts.
1. INTRODUCTION
Regardless of levels of musical training, most people
seem to have memory images of music, and also seem
to be able to give verbal accounts of these images, of
what we in our context call sonic images. Given this
seeming universality of sonic images, we are faced
with two obvious but non-trivial issues.
> Music is an ephemeral phenomenon in the sense that
at one moment the sound is here, the next moment it
is gone. Apparently, we are somehow able to create
more or less solid images in our minds of the sound,
and we are often able to conjure up some image of
what the music sounded like also long after we
heard it. This concerns not only various issues of
memory and recall (Snyder 2000), but also of
perception and transformation, or re-coding and
chunking, of continuous sound into somehow stable
entities in our minds (Godøy 2008).
> Musical sound will usually appear as feature-rich
or multidimensional, and although we can try to
point to features in the sound in playback or
performance, or try to display acoustic and/or
perceptual data associated with the sound, we
often make use of various verbal metaphors when
communicating with other people about our sonic
images. Such verbal metaphors are very useful
both in practical work (e.g. Porcello 2004) and in
research (e.g. Kendall and Carterette 1993), yet we
have challenges in trying to give more precise
meanings to these metaphors.
The emergence and nature of sonic images concerns
various disciplines such as acoustics, psychoacoustics,
the cognitive sciences and philosophy, as well musicol-
ogy and other music-related disciplines. Sonic images
may often be multimodal as well as have rich socio-
cultural significations, and this means that there may be
several different and/or complementary approaches to
the study of sonic images. The approach in this paper
will be by way of sonic objects based on the theories of
Pierre Schaeffer and his co-workers (Schaeffer 1966,
1998) as well as some more recent extensions (sum-
marised in Godøy 1997). Briefly stated, sonic objects
are holistically perceived fragments of sound, typically
with durations in the 0.5 to 5 seconds range. It will be
argued that sonic objects constitute the most significant
timescale of music in relation to the study of sonic
images. Sonic objects are at the nexus of several musical
and cognitive constraints, allowing us to study closely
the emergence and depictions of stable images from
continuous sound. The aim of this paper is then to give
an overview of the various elements that go into
shaping images of sonic objects.
In the next sections, sonic objects are first seen in
the context of musical imagery, something that sub-
sequently may be understood in the perspective of
embodied music cognition. With this background, we
shall have a look at different timescales for the
manifestation of various perceptually salient features
of music as the basis for sonic objects and sound-
related actions, something that leads us to the idea of
action imagery in musical imagery, an idea that can
have various applications in musical practice and
research.
2. MUSICAL IMAGERY
The term ‘musical imagery’ may have many different
meanings, ranging from denoting images of the
acoustic signal to various images associated with the
performance, the perception, and the emotive
experience of the music, extending also to more extra-
musical image associations that listeners may have to
musical sound, such as images of landscapes or his-
torical events. Aware of this multitude of possible
significations, we defined musical imagery in the call
for papers prior to an international conference on
musical imagery in 1999 as ‘our mental capacity for
imagining musical sound in the absence of a directly
audible sound source, meaning that we can recall and
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re-experience or even invent new musical sound
through our ‘‘inner ear’’ ’ (Godøy and Jørgensen
2001: ix). This may be a useful initial definition, but
there is of course much more to musical imagery,
both with regards to the content or nature of images
and with regards to the workings or phenomenal
underpinnings.
Musical imagery may be seen in the broader con-
text of what is generally referred to as mental ima-
gery, a term denoting our capacity for having internal
images of the world, as somehow originating in, but
not necessarily truthfully reflecting external experi-
ence, because bits and pieces from lived experience
may be recombined in novel and/or fictional ways.
Mental imagery has a history in Western philosophy
extending back to antiquity (see Schneider and
Godøy 2001 for an overview), but in the 1980s and
1990s has been more systematically studied, and has
been the topic of the so-called ‘mental imagery
debate’ (see e.g. Kosslyn 1994 for an overview). One
main element in this debate was the view of mental
imagery as strongly linked to the external world, or to
what we could call having a strong ecological content,
versus the view of mental imagery as more abstract,
as a so-called ‘symbol manipulating’ phenomenon
more in line with the workings of some kind of
computation machine. Another main element was the
emergence of so-called ‘functional equivalence’
between real-world perception and action, and ima-
gined perception and action. This meant that acts of
imagery showed similarities with real world acts, e.g.
that mentally rotating a figure would take more time
if the rotation was more extensive than if it was just a
small tilting, or that recalling the text of the last verse
of a song would take a longer time than the first
verse, as people often would scan through the whole
song from the beginning. With enhanced means for
brain activity observations, there emerged evidence
that mental imagery makes use of much of the same
neurophysiological apparatus as real perception and
action. Both the behavioural functional equivalence
and the shared neurophysiological apparatus of
mental imagery and real-world perception and action
are important for our present understanding of
musical imagery. Many features of real-world music
perception and music-related actions extend into the
realm of musical imagery and can thus serve as points
of departure for exploring sonic images.
Although visual domain mental imagery has the
longest research record (see Kosslyn 1994 for an
overview), there has previously also been some stu-
dies of auditory imagery (Reisberg 1992), as well as
our own collection of studies of musical imagery
(Godøy and Jørgensen 2001). However, the profusion
of non-invasive brain observation methods since 2000
has clearly strengthened both the ecological and the
functional equivalence aspects of mental imagery,
including musical imagery. Of particular interest is
the emerging evidence for links between sonic ima-
gery and movement imagery (see Zatorre and Hal-
pern 2005 for an overview). It has, for instance, been
shown that when professional pianists listen to piano
music, there is an activation of the motor control
apparatus in the brain as if they themselves were
playing piano (Haueisen and Kno¨sche 2001), and this
coupling of piano sound with sound-producing
movement can also be learned in a matter of weeks of
piano training (Bangert and Altenmu¨ller 2003). The
links between sound and movement images may be
partly hard-wired (Kohler, Keysers, Umilta`, Fogassi,
Gallese and Rizzolatti 2002), and there is now also
increasing support for the so-called ‘motor theory’ of
perception, a theory that for decades has suggested
that perception is indeed closely linked with mental
simulation of sound-producing actions (Galantucci,
Fowler and Turvey 2006). In our context it is sig-
nificant to note that there is a bidirectionality
between images of sound and action – for example,
that just seeing silent piano performance actions may
invoke mental images of sound (as suggested by
Haslinger, Erhard, Altenmu¨ller, Schroeder, Boecker
and Ceballos-Baumann 2005) – and this may perhaps
hold the key to a more volitional element of musical
imagery: if you want to create a mental image of the
sound, imagine that you are producing the sound or
making some movement to the sound.
Neurocognitive studies may give us valuable
information about the workings of musical imagery
and, importantly, strengthen the links between
musical imagery and motor imagery, but we still need
other approaches as well to tell us more about the
content of musical imagery. One possible approach is
then to observe how people move to music, and to try
to deduce something about covert mental sonic
images from overt behaviour.
3. EMBODIED MUSIC COGNITION
Since the end of the 1990s there has been a deluge of
publications on so-called ‘embodied cognition’.
Although this is a rather heterogenous topic, the com-
mon element for our context is that of seeing human
mental activity as intimately linked with sensations of
movement. The basic idea is that whatever we perceive
or think is correlated with mental simulations of body
movement, both those of other people (Wilson and
Knoblich 2005) and of our own prospective movements
(Gallese and Metzinger 2003), and with simulations of
what we believe are the cause, and even tactile, kine-
matic features of what we perceive (Berthoz 1997).
Keeping in mind that musical sound has tradi-
tionally been made by body movement, and seeing
how people make various kinds of body movement to
music in listening situations, as well as thinking of the
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countless verbal reports people make about move-
ment sensations in musical experience, we have come
to believe that images of body movements are integral
to musical experience (Godøy 2003; Leman 2008;
Godøy and Leman 2010). We also believe that asso-
ciation of body movement with music is universal and
independent of levels of musical training, because
most people have extensive experience of the links
between sound and movement. This is evident from
various instances of so-called ‘air instrument’ per-
formance such as air guitar, air drums and air piano,
where even people with no musical training seem to
have some knowledge of how the sounds are pro-
duced – that is, of the workings and spatial layout of
musical instruments, and of the kinematics as well as
the dynamics of sound-producing gestures (Godøy,
Haga and Jensenius 2006a). Also, there seemed to be
a fair amount of agreement in the spontaneous
drawings of gestures that people with different levels
of musical training made to musical excerpts in so-
called ‘sound tracing’ studies, as long as the musical
excerpts did not have too many features; for example,
there was good agreement for pitch contours and
salient dynamic patterns, but much less agreement for
multidimensional timbral features (Godøy, Haga and
Jensenius 2006b; Haga 2008). Similarly, there seemed
to be a fair level of consensus in the spontaneous
gestures that dancers made to music with regard to
the overall patterns of movement and sense of effort,
although the details varied (Haga 2008).
These and other studies (e.g. Eitan and Granot 2006)
support the idea that some sense of movement, and
hence also kinematics or movement shape, is often
spontaneously associated with music. We may speak of
motormimetic sketching of musical sound, meaning that
there is a continuum between very vague, low-acuity
gestural images of musical sound and more precise,
high-acuity gestural images of musical sound, depen-
dent upon the level of expertise of the listener (Godøy
et al. 2006a). Actually, this variable acuity is a phe-
nomenon built into the music itself in that a musical
passage, a rapidly ascending scale on the piano for
example, may be perceived with high acuity as a series
of individual tone-events associated with individual
finger-events, but may also be perceived with low acuity
at a more superordinate level as an ascending contour
of sound (individual tones fused into a chunk or gestalt)
coupled with a similar fusion of the finger actions into
an ascending gesture of the wrist, elbow, and maybe
even shoulder and torso. The point is that all tone-
events or sound-events in this embodied perspective are
understood as included in some kind of gesture trajec-
tory, and that images of these gesture trajectories can be
efficiently transmitted by musical sound to the listener,
who in turn may spontaneously perceive these trajec-
tories because of massive past experience of sound–
gesture links. Yet with increasingly complex musical
textures, it is also evident that musical sound can con-
vey several different gestures-inducing cues; for exam-
ple, in a musical excerpt containing a highly embellished
foreground melody, plus an energetic drum accom-
paniment, and a protracted string background, the lis-
tener may selectively focus on any of these textural
features, hence we may speak of rich gestural affor-
dances of musical sound (Godøy 2010a).
The awareness of sound-producing gestures is a
challenge to traditional Western ideas of music theory
in that the sound-producing gestures may be seen as
primordial to the tone: the sound-producing gesture
starts before, and often continues after, the tone/sound,
hence may be seen as a precondition for music. Also,
thinking sound-producing gestures as integral to music
may help us to bridge the gaps between the different
levels in music: the gesture is at the one and same time
both concerned with the micro-level of the singular
tone/sound and the fusion of several tones/sounds into
higher-level units. This fusion into more superordinate
chunks may be regarded as an instance of coarticula-
tion, meaning that otherwise individual events and
actions are contextually smeared and subsumed into
some higher-level chunk (Godøy 2008; Godøy, Jense-
nius and Nymoen 2009). In the case of the rapidly
ascending scale on the piano, the fusion of individual
tone-events and tone-onset finger actions into a higher-
level ascending sound contour and movement contour
is a typical case of coarticulation. Notably, then,
coarticulation in our context (as well as in linguistics
and other contexts) concern both the production and
the perception of musical sound.
It seems reasonable to suggest that most features of
musical sound may somehow be related to body
movement, including movements of our vocal appara-
tus, as can for instance be seen in cases of so-called scat
singing and beatboxing, where there seems hardly to be
any limit to the possibilities of vocal imitation of
sounds. We should also take into account the phe-
nomenon of so-called motor equivalence (Kelso, Fuchs,
Lancaster, Holroyd, Cheyne and Weinberg 1998),
meaning that one effector may be substituted for
another effector (e.g. that the vocal apparatus can
imitate sounds that are non-vocal in origin, or that we
can try to trace with our hands the shape of a sound
that is produced by other instrumental or electronic
means). The essential element of this is the motor
involvement, be that mental or overt, with what we
perceive and think. Notably, this also goes for visual
images as suggested in Berthoz 1997, hence that seeing
some kind of graphical representation of sound may
also induce a sensation of sound-related movement in
our minds. In summary, the basic tenet of embodied
cognition is that of constant mental (as well as some-
times also overt) simulation of what we hear and see,
something that we can exploit in developing our sonic
images.
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4. TIMESCALES AND FEATURES
Music-related body movements, as well as musical
sound, may be observed at different timescales: at
more macroscopic timescales in view of features such
as overall mode of movement and sound in a musical
work (e.g. as calm, agitated, fast or slow), or at a
more local timescale of singular gestures and singular
sound events (e.g. of local contours, or rhythmical,
textural or timbral features). In actual musical
experience, we may assume that both musical sound
and music-related movement are working at different
timescales in parallel – in other words, that we hear
the local in the context of the global and, conversely,
that we experience the global as a result of con-
catenations of local sonic events.
With the well-known timescale for perceiving pitch
and some timbral features (i.e. the stationary spectral
features) extending roughly from 20 to 20,000 events
per second, the timescale of less than 20 events per
second is where we find various textural and rhyth-
mical features of sound such as the Schaefferian
typological categories and their corresponding body
movements (more on this later). As for the 20 to
20,000 hz timescale, pitch and stationary timbral
features may of course be correlated with body
movements, like in singing, humming or whistling a
tone, or like in making different vowel shapes of the
vocal tract for different quasi-stationary timbres.
In addition to such an event-density timescale,
we also have thresholds for how long a segment of
sound we need to hear in order to perceive certain
features, meaning that we also have minimum dura-
tion thresholds for musical features. On the micro-
level, there are for instance duration thresholds for
perceiving pitch, some timbral features, event simul-
taneity and event order (see Moore 1995 for an
overview). But for longer timescales (i.e. those of
various rhythmic, textural and timbral patterns), we
seem to lack more systematic studies. One of the few
studies we know of in this area seems to suggest that
minimum duration thresholds may sometimes be as
short as 250 milliseconds for recognising salient sty-
listic features (Gjerdingen and Perrott 2008), and our
own informal tests seem to indicate that listeners’
minimum duration thresholds may vary considerably
from several seconds down to less than 500 milli-
seconds for perceiving salient musical features, in
other words seem to be within the approximate
duration limits for Schaeffer-inspired sonic objects.
Although the focus on the sonic object initially was
a pragmatic necessity in the early days of the musique
concre`te as a ‘closed groove’ (sillon ferme´) on the
phonogram disc for mixing sounds, and thus has a
certain flair of a serendipitous discovery, Schaeffer’s
focus on the sonic object is perhaps one of his most
significant achievements, and in the context of this
paper also one of the most significant ideas with
regards to the sonic image. From our present-day
perspective, we can see the following arguments in
favour of a Schaefferian focus on the timescale of the
sonic object.
> Style. Very short excerpts of musical sound will in
many cases suffice to recognise different musical
styles (Gjerdingen and Perrott 2008), and it has
also been shown that fragments from more large-
scale musical works may be rearranged in different
sequences and still preserve the overall experience
of style and aesthetic well-formedness (Eitan and
Granot 2008), something that should make us a
bit sceptical of received Western notions of the
importance of large-scale forms in music.
> Rhythm. The typical minimum duration thresh-
olds for recognising or determining salient rhyth-
mical patterns such as in various dance forms,
musical metre, ostinatos, and so forth seem to
conform with the approximate sonic object time-
scale of 0.5 to 5 seconds.
> Texture/timbre. As is the case for rhythmical
patterns, various textural patterns in instrumental,
vocal or electroacoustic music (various patterns of
fluctuations, foreground–background movements,
etc.), as well as various timbre-related fluctuations
and transient patterns, are all within the timescale
of the sonic object.
> Modal/tonal features. The timescale of the sonic
object seems sufficient to determine the modal
features of a group of successive tones, and partly
also to form some sensation of tonal properties,
e.g. tonal, functional tonal, free tonal, dodeca-
phonic, serial, and so on.
> Expressivity. Linked with rhythmical and textural
patterns, the timescale of the sonic object seems also
to be the timescale for rubato, ‘feel’/’groove’ or
various other expressive and articulatory features.
> Body movement. It has been shown that the grand
average duration for human actions is in the 3
seconds range, but also shorter or longer actions
occur (Schleidt and Kien 1997) to fit with the
approximate timescale of the sonic object.
With these arguments in favour of the primacy of
the sonic object, we should in our context of the sonic
image see the sonic object as situated in a three-level
model of timescales in music:
> Micro timescale, meaning continuous sound
within the sonic object.
> Meso timescale, meaning that of the sonic object
or the sound and action chunks.
> Macro timescale, meaning that of larger-scale
forms such as whole sections, movements, and
whole works, consisting of the concatenation of
successive sonic objects.
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Within the meso-level timescale of the sonic object,
we have Schaeffer’s so-called typological categories
for denoting the overall dynamic shapes of sonic
objects: the impulsive types, meaning sonic objects
that have a fairly abrupt attack followed by a shorter
or longer decay phase such as in percussive or
plucked sounds, the sustained types, meaning sonic
objects that have a more flat overall dynamical
envelope such as in bowed or blown sounds, and the
iterative types, meaning sonic objects that have a
rapid series of sound onsets or fluctuations, such as in
a tremolo or a drum roll. One essential element in our
context is that these typological categories of sonic
objects also correlate well with the distinct categories
of impulsive, sustained and iterative body gestures
(see Godøy 2006 for more on this). However, the
differences between these types also have to do with
timescales. If sustained sonic objects become very
short, they will become impulsive sonic objects, and,
conversely, if impulsive sonic objects become too
long, they will become sustained. If iterative sonic
objects slow down, they may become a series of
independent impulsive or even sustained sonic
objects. If sustained sonic objects have too much
internal movement, for example too large and too
rapid fluctuation in amplitude and/or harmonic
content, they may become iterative sonic objects.
These and various other time-dependent thresholds
that we find for musical features resemble what are
known as ‘phase transitions’ in human (and animal)
movement (Haken, Kelso and Bunz 1985), meaning
that incremental or linear changes may bring about
sudden categorical changes, as for example the phase
transition from conducting three beats per bar to one
beat per bar when gradually increasing the tempo in
3
4 time from slow to fast.
In addition, there are also various other envelopes
such as for timbral and pitch-related features within
the sonic objects that also may be mapped to various
body movements at different timescales. Going
through Schaeffer’s theoretical apparatus, it seems
that most (or perhaps all) features at different time-
scales may be correlated with some kind of body
movement and/or posture, hence that musical tex-
tures, be they instrumental, vocal or electroacoustic,
may also be seen as choreographies of sound-related
movements (Godøy 2006).
5. SONIC OBJECTS
One essential feature of the meso-level timescale is
that the sonic object can be perceived and imagined
as a whole, ‘all-at-once’ or ‘in a now’. Ideas of such
instantaneous, holistic overview images have been
suggested by (among others) Xenakis with his ideas
of diminuition by distantiated perspectives on musi-
cal events and his notions of hors-temps, or outside
time (Xenakis 1992). However, an intriguing account
of such instantaneous overview images can be found
in Husserl’s writing on temporal consciousness
(Husserl 1991), some of which dates back to 1893.
One of Husserl’s main ideas was that perception and
imagery proceed by a series of so-called ‘now-points’,
where each such now-point contains a subjective
sensation of the present moment, and that each such
now-point includes sensations of what has just passed
and, notably so, also of what is expected to come in
the immediate future. Husserl claimed that percep-
tion and imagery proceed in such a point-by-point
manner because in order to make sense of the world
we have to take extended segments of time and sound
into account: for example, in order to perceive or
imagine a melody we have to have several successive
tones in consciousness simultaneously, or in order to
perceive a single tone we have to have several succes-
sive phases of the tone in consciousness simulta-
neously. There are several intriguing issues with this
(see Godøy 2010b for a discussion); however, the most
remarkable element in Husserl’s argument is demon-
strating that there has necessarily to be some kind
of moment-by-moment or chunk-by-chunk mode of
perception and imagery, otherwise there would only be
an indistinct continuous stream of sensations.
Related ideas of the sense of the present moment or
the chunking of experience has been presented by
other thinkers (e.g. Michon 1978; Stern 2004), but
also, in theories of memory, there are various ele-
ments in favour of chunks at the meso-level timescale,
such as models of echoic and working memory
(Snyder 2000). Also the concept of chunking has
received much attention since the seminal work by
G. A. Miller. One of Miller’s main ideas was that in
order to efficiently cope with the complexity of the
world, we somehow have to make compressed ‘re-
codings’ of sensory information into more easily
tractable and remembered units, hence the idea of
chunking in perception and memory (Miller 1956).
In addition, similar ideas of chunking have been
suggested to be at work in the planning and control of
action (Lashley 1951). Although there has been con-
siderable controversy as to the degree of pre-planning
or anticipatory chunking (Elliott, Helsen and Chua
2001), there seems now to emerge evidence in favour
of the view of action as dependent on pre-planning
for efficiency, and that there is always an element of
chunking and coarticulation (see section 3 above) at
work both in perception and action (Rosenbaum,
Cohen, Jax, Weiss and van der Wel 2007).
Provided that we agree with the various arguments
in favour of the meso-level timescale of the sonic object
as the most significant in music as well as in music-
related movement, the next question becomes what are
the nature and status of the sonic object. Through a
series of what are really negative determinants,
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Schaeffer narrows down what the sonic object is not
(here quoted from Chion 1983: 34–5):
The sound object is not the sounding body.
The sound object is not the physical signal.
The sound object is not a fragment of a recording.
The sound object is not a symbol notated in a score.
The sound object is not a state of the soul.
So what is the sonic object then? Schaeffer’s answer
is that it is an ‘intentional unit’, meaning that it is a
mental image of a chunk where we make a synthesis
of various features, both those occurring in parallel
and those occurring sequentially, and think of it as a
coherent entity (Schaeffer 1966: 263). This also tou-
ches on the often discussed issue of so-called ‘reduced
listening’ in Schaeffer’s theory: the main point of this
strategy is that of primarily focusing on the rich set of
features that make up the sonic object, and not really
that of cutting off all links to the external world. This
is something that becomes quite clear if we read
closely Schaeffer’s explanation of the various typo-
logical and morphological features that go into sonic
objects. Real-world phenomena such as envelopes
and spectral components are present, and, what is
more, they are bundled into subjectively perceived
salient feature categories that we may also associate
with action chunks.
The links between the sonic object and the external
world are also present in the criteria for the con-
stitution of the sonic objects. Sonic objects may be
artificially created by arbitrary cuttings (by the phono-
graph loop, the magnetic tape, or the digital sound
file), but Schaeffer sought to find a more ‘natural’
basis for the sonic objects in what we would call
qualitative discontinuities in the continuous acoustic
signal. That was done with the so-called ‘stress–
articulation’ distinction – what we could call the
attack–sustain distinction. This scheme does, how-
ever, have the problem that streams of very short
sounds (i.e. streams of multiple attacks) may some-
times be perceived as a unit, hence Schaeffer also
applies the criteria of the overall envelopes associated
with sound-producing gestures (compare this with the
abovementioned typological categories of sustained,
impulsive and iterative sounds). These overall
dynamic envelopes of sonic objects are combined
with three overall pitch-related classes for sonic
objects – in other words, tonal (or pitched), non-tonal
(inharmonic or noise-dominated) and variable in
tonal or non-tonal content. These dynamic and pitch-
related typological classes are then combined in a
333 matrix, making up the very basic scheme for the
typology of sonic objects. Instructive examples of this
are presented in Schaeffer 1998 (CD3), and from
these examples as well as Schaeffer’s text we may get
a quite clear sense of the action-related nature of the
typological categories.
After this first differentiation of sonic objects in the
typology, the morphology of sonic objects provides
various progressively finer differentiations of the
more internal features of the sonic object, such as the
harmonic content and various patterns and evolu-
tions in the course of sonic objects. All these feature
differentiations are highly relevant for enhancing our
sonic images in any kind of music, be that instru-
mental or electroacoustic, or based on synthetic or
concrete sound, processed or unprocessed sound.
Since they are universally applicable, we could thus
speak of sonic object categories as generic, as may be
seen from the example of iterative sounds given on
tracks 25, 26 and 27 on CD3 of Schaeffer 1998. We
hear in succession the sonic objects of a drum roll, a
deep bassoon tone, and a fragment of electroacoustic
music, hence three sonic objects with completely
different origins, yet having the common feature of
being iterative sonic objects.
This generic classification scheme also applies to the
distinction of more complex sonic objects, to the so-
called composed and composite sonic objects. The
‘composed’ sonic object consists of the superposition of
two sonic objects, sometimes used to reinforce the
attack both in instrumental and in electroacoustic
music, as can be seen in figure 1. Here we have such a
reinforced attack from the first movement of Luto-
s"awski’s Jeux Venitiens, and the spectrogram of
Schaeffer’s example of such a ‘composed’ sonic object
from track 2 on CD3 (Schaeffer 1998). What Schaeffer
called the ‘composite’ sonic object is made up of two
sonic objects in succession that fuse into one sonic
object, what we may regard as a case of coarticulation.
Again, this is a generic concept, equally well
applicable to instrumental and electroacoustic music.
In figure 2 we see such a coarticulated sonic object
from Messian’s Regard de la Vierge where a rush of
demisemiquavers and the final quavers fuse together
to one gesture, and next to it, a coarticulated sonic
object from track 4 on CD3 of Schaeffer 1998, where
we have a crescendo to an accent-point that similarly
fuse.
In sum, the notion of the sonic object is based on a
holistic perception and imagery of a fragment of
musical sound; is generic or universal in its applica-
tion; is independent of particular instrumental, vocal
or electronic instantiation; and may also be corre-
lated with some action image.
6. ACTION IMAGERY IN MUSICAL IMAGERY
Seeing the intimate links between sonic objects and
sound-related actions, it may be argued that there is a
component of action imagery in musical imagery. This
means that images of sound may trigger images of
actions, and, conversely, that images of actions may
trigger images of sound in our minds.
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As integral elements of the sonic object, we can
then think of the following music-related actions as
possible active ingredients in musical imagery.
> Excitatory and modulatory actions, both of singular
tones/sounds and of more composite and/or coarti-
culated chunks of tones/sounds. This also includes
the timbre–texture continuum – that is, the con-
tinuum between sustained, iterative and impulsive
sounds, and other related feature dimensions.
> Sound-tracing actions, meaning actions that are not
directly related to sound-production but still closely
related to sound features such as tracing (by hand,
or by other body movement) the resonant envelope,
spectral shape, and so on of a sonic object.
> Sound-accompanying actions, meaning various
actions that are somehow in synchrony with some
features of the music, e.g. as in dance and other
body movement to music, but where the kine-
matics or the geometry of the action trajectories
may be more independent of the music.
The kinematics and dynamics of sound-related
actions can create images of sonic objects, visualising
and making tangible the otherwise ephemeral sound.
This has potentially a number of applications in
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Figure 1. A ‘composed’ sonic object with a reinforced attack from the first movement of Lutos"awski’s Jeux Venitiennes,
rehearsal mark F (left), and the spectrogram of Schaeffer’s example of such a ‘composed’ sonic object with a reinforced
attack from track 2 on CD3 (Schaeffer 1998), where we first see the two components separately, then together (right).
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Figure 2. A coarticulated sonic object from Messian’s Regard de la Vierge, bar 61, of a gesture to an accent-point (left), and
next to it (right), a coarticulated sonic object from track 4 on CD3 (Schaeffer 1998), where we have a similar gesture to an
accent-point, first displaying the two components and then the coarticulatory fused sonic object.
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composition, improvisation, musical performance,
music education and rehabilitation, musicology and
music information retrieval, as well as in music
technology. For instance, the relationship between
action and sound concerns various interface devel-
opments in general, and the subject of mapping in
particular (e.g. Wanderley and Battier 2000; Hunt,
Wanderley and Paradis 2003). Such action–sound
links also have potential applications in research, and
we are presently developing hand-held devices
equipped with various sensors (i.e. accelerometers,
and pressure and position sensors) that we hope will
allow us to navigate in multidimensional sonic fea-
ture spaces by actions, hence exploiting the potential
of embodied images of sonic objects in various con-
texts. In all this work, the many links between actions
and sonic objects will be our guiding principle.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Needless to say, we have very many challenges ahead
of us in trying to understanding the emergence and
nature of sonic images in our minds, such as the
interactions of sound and body movement as neuro-
cognitive, behavioural and musical–aesthetic phenom-
ena, and such as the temporal re-coding of continuous
sound and body movement into more stable images in
our minds. Yet from what we know now, it seems
reasonable to suggest that images of sound-related
actions may be a significant component of sonic ima-
ges. Images of sound-related actions can trigger sonic
images in our minds and can have great exploratory
potential. Action imagery in musical imagery can
actually be seen as a strategy to implement Schaeffer’s
method for exploring sonic objects, meaning progres-
sively discovering and becoming aware of more and
more sonic features by actively tracing their shapes and
their evolution. This also means thinking features
in a top-down manner, starting out from low-acuity
sketches of overall shapes of the sonic objects (as in
Schaeffer’s typology), and gradually differentiating
more and more features and sub-features (as in
Schaeffer’s morphology) by actively tracing them, as
well as (as a long-term goal) correlating these actively
traced features with the acoustic features of the sonic
objects.
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